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International Law and the Turn to Political Economy 
 
John Haskell* and Akbar Rasulov** 
 
Akbar There has been an interesting shift within international law in recent years. A lot of projects 
have started to emerge that all seem to proceed from the same basic assumption, which is that 
international lawyers ought to start paying more attention to questions of political economy, reflect 
more consciously about all the different ways in which global economic processes and 
international law intersect, and explore more systematically the relationship between law and 
international economic governance.1 As someone who works in the area of international economic 
law, I find this trend very curious. 
 
John  There has, indeed, been a lot of talk lately among international lawyers about political 
economy. Going to conferences, hearing people talk about their work, you certainly do get the feel 
that more and more international lawyers are beginning to think that political economy is an 
important topic for international law to address. But is that enough to say that there has been a 
turn to political economy?  
 Disciplinary turns are notoriously complex phenomena.2 There is nothing simple or self-
evident about them. Is a ‘turn’ something that takes place in the minds of people or in the 
institutional realities that surround them? Is it a purely theoretical event or is it more an act of 
disciplinary contestation?  
I think it is very important for us to be clear just what exactly we have in mind here. It is 
evident that international lawyers today invoke the language of political economy more readily 
than they used to. But does that in itself show or prove anything? Surely, whether or not a 
disciplinary turn has taken place cannot be resolved by just tracking what language is ‘trending’ in 
international law conversations. 
 
Akbar  Exactly. There is an obvious temptation in this kind of situation to look for some kind of 
easy metric: the number of times a certain word or phrase is mentioned in the literature, the 
number of times a given concept is referenced, etc. I can see why one may want to go down that 
route – it gives you the satisfying illusion of certainty – but I think this way of approaching the 
problem takes us in the wrong direction. What we are dealing with when it comes to disciplinary 
turns is, essentially, the evolution of a disciplinary sensibility, a transformation, if you will, in the 
structure of a collective consciousness. How do you evidence what is happening at the level of collective 
consciousness? Certainly, not just by tracking the number of times a certain word or concept gets 
name-checked.  
 
John  But let me ask this then: what exactly does the concept of ‘political economy’ represent 
here? I think most of us have a more or less clear idea what we have in mind when we speak about 
‘the linguistic turn’ or ‘the historical turn’. Both history and linguistics are relatively well-established 
disciplines with a long track record of inter-disciplinary crossovers. I am not sure we can put 
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political economy in the same class, however. It is not really a discipline, at least not the way it 
seems to be experienced in international law today.  
 
Akbar  No, it is not, and I think that is an important point. Political economy has been historically 
constructed as a discipline – some may argue it is the parent discipline of all economic sciences – 
but that is certainly not the way international lawyers today relate to it. The turn to political 
economy that we are witnessing today in international law is not a turn towards some kind of 
defined theoretical field, discipline, or methodology.  
 
John  Right, and more often than not it seems to me political economy for international lawyers 
is just a tactical buzzword. If we look at the way international lawyers typically invoke the theme 
of political economy, the move seems to be just a form of critical self-distancing, of posture. On 
the surface, the argument focuses on politics and economics but once you scratch that surface the 
basic idea behind it is simply that there is something wrong about the way mainstream international 
law scholarship is developing and we need to change that. There is not really anything 
interdisciplinary or even very programmatic here. The theme of political economy is basically just 
a stand-in for some kind of intellectual and political protest against conservative, simplistic ways 
of imagining global governance mixed with the old Enlightenment belief that a cognitive 
revolution leads historical change.  
 
Akbar  When we talk about disciplinary turns we need to shift the emphasis from the word 
‘disciplinary’ to the word ‘turn’. The key to that is we should move from thinking of history, 
linguistics, anthropology, political economy –  you name it – as universal theoretical constants, as 
projections of some pre-existing intellectual essences. There isn’t one single ‘correct’ or ‘naturally 
given’ concept of political economy that is valid for all disciplines. How international lawyers 
interpret the concept of political economy does not need to be synonymous or equivalent to how 
any other discipline or profession treats it.  
Let us not deceive ourselves: what international lawyers do under the rubrics of 
anthropology or history is also very different from what professional anthropologists and 
historians usually do. And that, of course, is perfectly fine. Historians do not have any monopoly 
over the idea of the historical method, just like economists do not have any monopoly over the 
idea of political economy. 
 
John  I agree, they don’t. But I think also we are running two different lines of argument here. 
The first argument is that the turn to political economy is not really an exercise in inter-
disciplinarity but something else entirely. The second argument is that the practice of joining or 
initiating a disciplinary turn is actually a form of performative activity. It is something like an 
invocation of a trope, rather than a truth-statement that involves a reflection on some pre-existing 
disciplinary formations. My interest lies mainly with the latter theme.  
Speaking about disciplinary turns typically evokes the notion of some quasi-territorialised 
field of interdisciplinary linkages: linguistics is here, international law is there, history and 
anthropology way over to that side, and so on. I find this kind of mental imagery deeply misleading. 
It misrepresents how blurry and unstable the ‘external’ boundaries between different fields are, 
and it also obscures the enormous diversity of epistemologies and traditions we can find within 
each of these fields.  
 
Akbar  Yes, these are two fairly different lines of argument, and in my case, it is the first one that 
I find more interesting. When they perform their turn to political economy today, international 
lawyers do not come to political economy as though it were a distinct discipline.    
As a disciplinary project, political economy has always had a fairly distinct theoretical 
profile. Its main themes, aesthetically and ideologically, have been the concept of social physics – 
  
the assumption that there exist ‘iron laws’ of social life that work in a way similar to Newton’s law 
of gravity – and the idea of what you might call ‘finding the public within the private’.  
A large part of it goes back to its origins in the early Enlightenment period, when scholars 
such as Antoine de Montchretien started converging around the idea that one of the main 
functions of government was not only to bring peace and to protect l’ordre public, but also to 
encourage economic activity. As Ellen Meiksins Wood notes, Montchretien’s basic presumption 
here was that the government essentially performs the same function vis-à-vis the rest of the 
society as the pater familias does vis-à-vis his household: its main task is to ‘rule benevolently … 
with an eye to the well-being, harmony, and prosperity of [all]’.3 The crucial difference here, of 
course, is that most people in the wider society are ultimately motivated more by narrow self-
interest than any kind of familial sentiment. But that, Montchretien remarks immediately, is not 
actually a problem, since ‘selfish passions and the appetite for gain, far from threatening the 
common good, can [actually become] its foundation’.4  
 
John  It is this last bit that I think provides us with the theoretical crux: the open 
acknowledgement that private vice can give rise to public virtue. This is the same logic that we see 
in many segments of the international law literature, this idea that the universal can emerge from 
the particular, the substantive from the formal. To my mind, all this evokes a deeply Christian 
motif in a distinctly American register. It is the logic of the ‘Field of Dreams’, of Noah’s Ark, the 
notion that if you follow your particular dream, it will somehow result in the greatest good possible 
for all.  
 
Akbar  I agree that the key conceptual theme operating here is this idea that private vice can be 
converted to public virtue. Aesthetically and ideologically, it is the main tipping point, if you will. 
Once you have accepted it, then it only becomes a matter of time before you ask yourself: how 
does this mechanism of conversion work? How can all these ‘selfish passions’ and ‘private vices’ 
be best harnessed and controlled, as opposed to, say, resisted, repressed, or educated-away? Hence, 
incidentally, the typical emphasis in the political economy tradition on the ideas of ‘management’ 
and ‘promotion’, as opposed to prescription and sanction (as in Hobbes or Austin), and hence also 
the traditional concept of political economy as the discipline that studies the public management 
of private rationalities.  
In one way or another, we can trace this vision of political economy all the way from 
Montchretien and the Scottish Enlightenment, down to Karl Polanyi and Douglass North. Marx 
adds a few unusual wrinkles, but even he under certain conditions can be subsumed within this 
broader tradition. In any event, the important point here is that this concept of political economy 
– the idea of the public management of private rationalities – has ultimately nothing to do with 
what political economy means to international lawyers today.  
For international lawyers, political economy is basically a ‘what’, not a ‘how’; it is something 
that is just ‘out there’, not something that you ‘do’. There is no sense of any kind of fixed reasoning 
protocol or the use of a special epistemological apparatus.   
 
John  If you ask international lawyers what they mean by political economy, I think what you are 
going to find is that with most of them it simply stands for some vague idea that economic 
structures and political power are fused together; that economic processes are not really 
autonomous or self-sustaining; that they are heavily infused with political struggles and conflict, 
etc. And this, of course, goes back to our earlier point, how should we then understand this idea 
of a ‘turn’ to political economy? What is it we are actually ‘turning’ towards? Earlier you mentioned 
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the idea of disciplinary sensibility. Are you using it in the same way Martti Koskenniemi does at 
the start of The Gentle Civilizer of Nations?5 
 
Akbar  Yes, but I prefer to think of it in slightly more structuralist terms. Every discipline has a 
certain sensibility at its core. This sensibility is organised around a certain langue-like structure, 
something like what Duncan Kennedy calls a ‘mode of legal consciousness’. 6 When the building 
blocks of this structure shift or transform, we experience a disciplinary turn. A disciplinary turn is 
an event in the history of disciplinary sensibility, and the history of disciplinary sensibility is the 
history of its structural transformations.  
 
John I am not sure I share your enthusiasm for the concept of sensibility. I think it is too woolly 
and it also has the unfortunate tendency to encourage precisely the kind of homogenising 
assumptions about disciplinary fields that we should resist.  
I am interested in exploring the idea of disciplinary turns in a slightly different context: the 
practice of participating in disciplinary turns, to my mind, is essentially a kind of performative 
activity as well as an act of disciplinary politics. What I mean by this is that there is a certain kind 
of legitimation/de-legitimation dynamic that immediately sets in the moment we invoke the 
narrative of turns. And in order to understand how this dynamics plays out in any given case, we 
have to look at things in a historical perspective. A lot of this new scholarship that we are talking 
about has been produced by scholars who ‘came of age’ professionally in the last ten or fifteen 
years. 
 
Akbar That is true. But if we start approaching the phenomenon of disciplinary turns in historical 
perspective, we need to identify the mechanics of their temporal production. What sort of factors 
can typically trigger a disciplinary turn? Under what institutional and demographic conditions? By 
highlighting the fact that it is primarily the scholars who ‘came of age’ professionally in the last 
fifteen years, you seem to be suggesting that the turn to political economy has a relatively clear 
inter-generational profile. Why do you think that may be the case?  
 
John  Without getting into the sociological gristle of our current disciplinary milieu, I think the 
answer, at least to a significant extent, has to be sought outside the immediate field of legal 
academia. It is difficult not to see the 2008 crisis as one of those important triggering moments. 
This is not to say, of course, that there haven’t been other contributing factors. The boogeyman 
of ‘neoliberalism’, for instance, started circulating ages ago, and critical legal scholars have been 
engaged in a rearguard fight against rightwing ‘law and economics’ for several decades.7 To some 
extent, these struggles have drawn inspiration from postcolonial studies and poststructuralist 
theory, but it has also been deeply influenced by the broader ethos of old-school liberal 
humanitarian movements, the kind one would associate historically with the idea of social 
democracy. What all of these movements share, at their core, is a profound concern about what I 
tend to think of as the visceral scale of inequality locally and abroad.  
So, in a nutshell, what has been different about this new generation of scholars, is that this 
visceral sense of inequality nowadays is far more commonly associated with the idea of capitalism, 
especially whether it is sustainable and what other alternative systems could potentially take its 
place. And this, if you will, almost logically takes you in the direction of that kind of thinking that 
feeds interest in political economy.  
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Akbar  So, the turn to political economy in your reading is basically a new generation of 
international law scholars waking up to the visceral realities of capitalism? 
 
John  Yes, and them doing so as international law scholars, rather than ‘simply’ as concerned 
citizens. And not that it was necessarily a case of awakening, but it seems the confluence of the 
intellectual and ideological legacies and the historical experience of the 2008 crisis have enabled a 
renewal of interest in topics that had not been there before. Take, for instance, Anne Saab’s article; 
the idea that international lawyers can have something to say about world hunger that goes beyond 
the concept of a human right to food, and to link this, moreover, to questions of economic 
governance and security, this would have seemed fundamentally out of place not all that long ago. 
 
Akbar You say ‘capitalism’. But is it any specific idea of capitalism we are dealing with? Marx’s 
concept of capitalism, for example, is very different from Polanyi’, and there is, of course, a lot 
more than just Marx’s own writings when it comes to the Marxist tradition.  If you follow the 
analytical framework Althusser outlines,8 you can find yourself moving in a very different direction 
from where you would go if you followed Lukacs.9 Even when it comes to theorising the 
relationship between capitalism and international law - for instance, with Mieville and Chimni - 
there is a lot more than one Marxism to choose from. And then there are also all those 
‘international political economy’ scholars who have their own Marxist-style take on these 
questions.10 
 
John There are several different traditions of thinking about capitalism that we can detect in 
contemporary international law scholarship, and Marxism, I would say, is not the most dominant 
one. Broadly speaking, most of this scholarship, as I see it, converges around the idea that every 
socio-economic situation in which international law is implicated is the result, ultimately, of 
political decisions that are made in an unequal fashion and that bear an unequal distributive impact. 
The general goal for international lawyers is to learn how to think about this pragmatically but also 
work towards a more deliberative and egalitarian regime of governance, and moving beyond 
traditional economic dogmas is the first step on this journey.  
 Take the concept of money, for instance; once you realise that money - unlike what 
mainstream economics suggests - does not arise naturally out of exchange but is a legally 
constituted device generated and backed up by the state, your policy options are suddenly 
broadened.11 And the politics of this move mean the struggle over the distribution of resources 
and control comes to the fore. This is not to say one can just appropriate the means of production 
and everything else follows suit. As Nikolas Rajkovic shows in this issue, the structures of 
geographical imagination you work with can be a very important constraining factor in terms of 
deciding what you can and cannot achieve. A structuralist Marxism, like we see in Althusser, would 
remind us that change and understanding resist any easy prescription. So I think there is not really 
any one tradition to think through our understanding of capitalism and it is all quite fraught. 
 
Akbar But very few Marxists have ever suggested that it would be enough just to appropriate the 
means of production and everything else will follow suit, and no one has ever argued that the 
structures of geographic consciousness do not play an important role in politics. To an extent, 
you’ve set up a straw man here. Just think of all those writings by David Harvey, Giovanni Arrighi, 
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and others.12 The same goes for the idea that institutional constructs like money are, ultimately, 
generated and backed up by the state. Indeed, if anything, the one tradition that has always insisted 
that you cannot understand the workings of economic institutions in separation from the state is 
Marxism.13    
 
John That may be true, but Marxism may also come with significant baggage for thinking 
through things. I think, for instance, there is a tendency in Marxist thought to ultimately see ‘law' 
as part of an active ‘superstructure' and to pair that with a relatively under-theorised notion of the 
‘economy in the last instance’. And it remains marginal, because if you are writing within the 
international law vernacular, you ultimately have to accept, on some level, that law is more 
captivating than one might otherwise admit. Now, once we put this idea together with the idea I 
alluded to earlier, that it a visceral kind of reaction that lies at the root of this newly established 
interest in capitalism, the intellectual figure that comes closest to capturing the spirit of things here, 
I would suggest, is certainly not just Marx, but Carl Schmitt.  
In the second appendix to The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt argues that the fundamental 
problem with liberalism – I mean, the mainstream tradition of thinking about international 
economic governance – is that it ignores that every human ordering is ultimately premised on a 
‘primitive law’ of ‘appropriation-distribution-production’.14 This is what Schmitt calls the ‘lie of 
production… the Beehive formula, of things governing themselves’.15 He takes this into dark 
territory by naming the Fuhrer as the inescapable ‘great appropriator’ and lamenting the ‘last great 
heroic act’ of Europe to be the conquest of North America - but, naturally, we don’t need to follow 
him to such insidious conclusions. What seems important to me in his argument, at any rate, is the 
emphasis he puts on the idea of violent appropriation: every system of distribution and production 
is built on a logic of appropriation, and you cannot fundamentally shape the world anew without 
revisiting this initial appropriation logic.  
 
Akbar  I disagree about Schmitt being closer to the spirit of times than Marxism, but it is 
interesting that you phrase it like that. If you look at the articles that follow, this theme of the 
original sin of appropriation seems to feature quite prominently in each of them, but especially in 
Saab’s essay, which is about the complex role international law plays in the maintenance and 
reproduction not only of the general regime of food security, but also, as a logical corollary, of 
scarcity and famine. There is an interesting parallel here with Scott Veitch’s book on law and 
irresponsibility.16   
 
John  I guess I can accept your idea of sensibility here, because there is something that we can 
feel tying together this literature, which gravitates around these themes we are discussing. The 
spectre of Schumpeterian constant creative destruction hovers very prominently over Rajkovic’s 
reimagination of jurisdiction. Moudud writes primarily as an economist who seeks to marry 
Modern Money Theory 17 with the critical legal studies tradition, but also, what one immediately 
sees behind his narrative is the argument about the centrality of law and finance as instituted 
regimes of coercion.  
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Akbar  You mention instituted regimes of coercion, and before that you also spoke how it is a 
certain sense of disenchantment that animates this new wave of scholarship, a disenchantment 
towards the traditional protocols of reason adopted in mainstream international law scholarship 
and towards the global political compact that’s formed in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. It sounds 
to me that what you are saying is that the real elephant in the room here is not so much Carl 
Schmitt as Max Weber.  
 
John  That is certainly possible, but I think this is a conversation we should leave for another 
occasion. 
 
